

ARISTOTLE'S *NICOMACHEAN ETHICS* VIII.9, 1160a14–30

INTRODUCTION

This difficult and evidently corrupt text of Aristotle has given rise to a variety of differing readings among the commentators. I shall propose a new and conservative emendation of the text, which, I believe, resolves all of the difficulties. But it is helpful first to take stock of those difficulties, in order to see what is required of a solution.

Our discussion will be easier if we divide and label the passage in a manner similar to I. Bywater,¹ viz.:

- A.** αἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλαι κοινωνίαι κατὰ μέρη τοῦ συμφέροντος ἐφίενται, οἷον πλωτῆρες μὲν τοῦ κατὰ τὸν πλοῦν πρὸς ἐργασίαν χρημάτων ἢ τι τοιοῦτον, συστρατιῶται δὲ τοῦ κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον, εἴτε χρημάτων εἴτε νίκης ἢ πόλεως ὀρεγόμενοι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ φυλέται καὶ δημόται.
B. ἔναι δὲ τῶν κοινωνιῶν δι' ἡδονὴν δοκοῦσι γίνεσθαι, θιασωτῶν καὶ ἐρανιστῶν· αὗται γὰρ θυσίας ἐνεκα καὶ συνουσίας.
C. πάσαι δ' αὗται ὑπὸ τὴν πολιτικὴν εἰκόασιν εἶναι.
D. οὐ γὰρ τοῦ παρόντος συμφέροντος ἡ πολιτικὴ ἐφίεται, ἀλλ' εἰς ἅπαντα τὸν βίον**²
E. θυσίας τε ποιούντες καὶ περὶ ταύτας συνόδους, τιμὰς <τε> ἀπονέμοντες τοῖς θεοῖς, καὶ αὐτοῖς ἀναπαύσεις πορίζοντες μεθ' ἡδονῆς.
F. αἱ γὰρ ἀρχαῖαι θυσίαι καὶ σύνοδοι φαίνονται γίνεσθαι μετὰ τὰς τῶν καρπῶν συγκομιδὰς οἷον ἀπαρχαί· μάλιστα γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ἐσχόλαζον τοῖς καιροῖς.
G. πάσαι δὴ φαίνονται αἱ κοινωνίαι μόρια τῆς πολιτικῆς εἶναι· ἀκολουθήσουσι δὲ αἱ τοιαῦται φιλίαι ταῖς τοιαύταις κοινωνίαις.

It is also helpful to give names to some of these passages, which signify at least their superficial character. **B** has the appearance of an objection to the claim stated and explained by examples in **A**. Let us call **A** the 'thesis' and **B** the 'objection'. **C** and **D** together have the appearance of a 'rejoinder' to **B**. The character of **E** is unclear, but **F** at least seems to be an 'etiology', which appears to be offered in support of what is asserted in **E**. The apparent role of **G** is to serve as the conclusion of the passage. It would of course be desirable that a solution of the difficulties of this text account for, and perhaps even preserve, the *prima facie* character of its component passages.

The difficulties of the text may roughly be divided into those that are primarily linguistic and those that are primarily argumentative: the former are most fundamental and are focussed on a particular clause; the latter are derivative and concern the passage as a whole. There are three linguistic difficulties, all of which concern the participial clause **E**: (i) the masculine plural participles of that clause (*ποιούντες*, *ἀπονέμοντες*, *πορίζοντες*) lack evident antecedents; (ii) it is not clear what earlier sentence **E** is intended to explain and complete; (iii) the relation of the first sub-clause within **E** (*θυσίας... συνόδους*) to the second (*τιμὰς... μεθ' ἡδονῆς*) is both awkward and unclear. Note that all of the these problems could be traced to the lack of a finite verb within **E**, which, if present, might simultaneously provide antecedents for the participles, turn **E** into an independent clause, and clarify the relation among the two sub-clauses by making one explanatory of the other. The emendation I will later argue for involves providing such a finite verb.

¹ See his 'Aristotelia, III', *Journal of Philology*, 17 (1885), 69–71.

² Bywater marks a lacuna.

The argumentative difficulties of the text are not narrowly focussed on **E**: (iv) Should a14, *μὲν οὖν* be taken absolutely ('so then'), or does *μὲν* introduce a contrast, and, if the latter, is the contrast completed by *δέ* at a19 or a21, or does Aristotle neglect altogether to complete the contrast? (v) Is the scope of a21, *πάσαι δ' αὐται* narrow, so that it has the same referent as a20, *αὐται*, or is it wide, so that it refers as well, or perhaps solely, to *αἱ ἄλλαι κοινωνίαι* introduced at a14? (vi) Are the philosophical notions of **CD** to be coordinated and identified with those introduced in **A**? In particular, should we accept the following identities:

ὑπὸ τὴν πολιτικὴν = *μέρος τῆς πολιτικῆς*
τὸ παρὸν συμφέρον = *τὸ κατὰ μέρη συμφέρον*³
τὸ συμφέρον εἰς ἅπαντα τὸν βίον = *τὸ καθόλου συμφέρον*⁴ (*τὸ συμφέρον ὅλων*)⁵?

Finally, (vii) What is the role of the etiology, **F**? In particular, is it meant to explain what is asserted in **E**, and, if so, *how* is it meant to do so?

At least eight different opinions have been proposed by commentators and translators for repairing this text. (See Table I below.) However, it is possible to sort these into four more basic groups:

(1) Those who regard **CD** as an interruption: Bywater,⁶ followed it seems by J. Stewart,⁷ takes **B** to be dislocated from its original position following **CD**; J. Burnet, arguing that it is 'safer... to assume an interpolation than a dislocation',⁸ thinks **CD** should simply be omitted; whereas F. Dirlmeier regards **CD** as a parenthesis.⁹

(2) Those who regard **BCD** as an interruption: J. Cook Wilson,¹⁰ followed by R. A. Gauthier and J. Y. Jolif,¹¹ sees all of **BCD** as unwanted material, perhaps inserted by an inexpert redactor; C. Michelet regards the same material as parenthetical.¹² M. Ostwald's approach is similar: he regards **B** as an interpolation, then places **C** and **D** after **F**.¹³

(3) Those who regard **D** as an interruption: A. Grant,¹⁴ following A. Fritzsche,¹⁵ would omit the full stop after **B** and then treat only **D** as a parenthesis.

(4) Those who regard only **E** as an interruption: A. Price,¹⁶ following a suggestion of D. J. Allan, would excise just the troublesome lines of **E**.

It is useful to tabulate these various opinions. On the plausible assumptions that it is in general more radical to posit a dislocation than an interpolation,¹⁷ and to posit

³ The right-hand equivalent does not in fact occur in the text, though something like it is implied. ⁴ Cp. *Pol.* 1260a24. ⁵ Cp. *EN* 1141a13.

⁶ Op. cit., 70–1; cf. also his *apparatus criticus* of the OCT *EN*, ad loc.

⁷ J. A. Stewart, *Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle* (Oxford, 1892), ad loc.

⁸ J. Burnet, *The Ethics of Aristotle*, (London, 1900), ad loc.

⁹ F. Dirlmeier, *Aristoteles: Nikomachische Ethik* (Darmstadt, 1969), 526.

¹⁰ J. Cook Wilson, 'On Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* VII, xiv.2 and xii.2', *Classical Review* 16 (1902), 23–8. He says, of 1160a14ff: 'There is another place of great difficulty in *N. Eth.* Bk. VIII.ix where a coherent context is produced by leaving out a passage,' p. 28.

¹¹ R. A. Gauthier and J. Y. Jolif, *L'Éthique à Nicomaque* (Louvain, 1970), 698.

¹² C. L. Michelet, ed., *Aristotelis Ethicorum Nicomacheorum libri decem* (Berlin, 1829, 2nd ed. 1848) ad loc.

¹³ M. Ostwald, trans. *Nicomachean Ethics* (New York, 1962), 232.

¹⁴ A. Grant, *The Ethics of Aristotle Illustrated with Essays and Notes*, 4th edition revised (London, 1885), ad loc.

¹⁵ A. T. H. Fritzsche, ed. *Αριστοτέλης. Περὶ φιλίας. Aristotelis Ethicorum Nicomacheorum liber octavus et nonus* (Giessen, 1847), ad loc.

¹⁶ A. W. Price, *Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle* (Oxford, 1989), 195n: 'I would prefer to follow a proposal that D. J. Allan pencilled into his text: that we bracket, presumably as a gloss, *thusiās* in 23 to *hēdonēs* in 25.' Price has indicated in correspondence that he has since come to see this suggestion as implausible. ¹⁷ Cf. Burnet's remark ad loc.

Table 1

Ostwald	A			F	C	D	G	(group 2)
Bywater/Stewart	A	C	D	B	E	F	G	(group 1)
Cook Wilson/G&J	A				E	F	G	(group 2)
Burnet	A	B			E	F	G	(group 1)
Price/Allan	A	B	C	D		F	G	(group 4)
Michelet	A	(B	C	D)	E	F	G	(group 2)
Dirlmeier	A	B	(C	D)	E	F	G	(group 1)
Grant/Fritzsche	A	B	C	(D)	E	F	G	(group 3)

an interpolation than a parenthesis, we might also rank them, in rough order from least to most conservative (see Table 1).¹⁸

DIFFICULTIES IN THESE VIEWS

None of these views is entirely satisfactory, and all give rise to further difficulties. If we accept Bywater's suggestion, that we place **B** after **CD**, then the opening phrase of **C**, *πάσαι δ' αὐται*, must be taken to refer back to the *πλωτῆρες, συστρατιῶται, κ.τ.λ.* of **A**. But then the objection which is introduced later by **B**, *ἔναι δὲ κ.τ.λ.*, would be 'answered' by **EF** alone – yet **EF** contains no statement replying to this objection, and the statement which *did* serve as a reply (**C**) now plays another role.

Furthermore, once *πάσαι δ' αὐται* is taken to refer back to **A**, then **C** becomes redundant, since it must be read simply as repeating what was claimed at a8–9, and is reasserted at a28–9.¹⁹ Such a reiteration would be less awkward if one supposed *δή* rather than *δέ* at a21, yet this would be implausible with the relatively weak *εἰκόασιν*, and in any case, there would have been little argument by that point to justify a more forceful reiteration of the thesis. (Note, however, that at a28, after an objection has been defeated and accompanied by the stronger *φαίνονται*, we do find *δή*.)

Moreover, given that *πάσαι δ' αὐται* is taken to refer back to **A**, then we are bound to accept all of the equivalences set forth in argumentative difficulty (vi) above. Yet at least one of these is doubtful. *τὸ παρὸν συμφέρον* = *τὸ κατὰ μέρη συμφέρον*²⁰ is doubtful because the phrases have different contrasting opposites: 'the advantage of the moment' contrasts with 'long term advantage'; and 'partial advantage' contrasts with 'total advantage.' Indeed, given that merchant trade was something of a stock example of long-term deferment and risk, it would have been very odd for Aristotle to refer to sailors on a trading voyage as men who are seeking 'the advantage of the moment'; similarly with soldiers encamped around a city during a drawn-out siege (surely the image conjured by a17–18, *πόλεως ὀρεγόμενοι*).

Again, on Bywater's hypothesis, we should read **E** as following immediately upon **B**, i.e. we should read: *αὐται γὰρ θυσίας ἔνεκα καὶ συνουσίας, θυσίας τε ποιούντες καὶ περὶ ταύτας συνόδους κ.τ.λ.* But then **E** is both awkward and redundant, for it merely repeats with more words what **B** already says, viz. that these *κοινωνίαι* are for

¹⁸ The artificial character of this ranking is conceded. Nevertheless, it is useful to *order* the suggestions and to have a rough sense of how these suggestions 'save the phenomena' to a greater or lesser degree.

¹⁹ This is the only difficulty in Bywater's view which is avoided by Burnet's suggestion that **CD** be omitted. Dirlmeier's view is no better off. If, with Dirlmeier, we place **CD** within parentheses, then the reference of *πάσαι δ' αὐται* becomes indeterminate. Presumably it should refer back to **A**, but in that case **B** becomes essentially a dislocation, and we have Bywater's opinion in essence.

²⁰ See note 3 above.

the sake of sacrifices and fellowship. If, however, we follow Bywater's speculation and read οὔτοι for αὐται at a20, there results an absurdity: surely Aristotle would not claim that the *men* are or come about *θυσίας ἔνεκα καὶ συνουσίας*.²¹ There would be no *absurdity*, to be sure, if a verb such as *πράττουσι* were understood, but this variation in verb would be awkward and unexpected, given Aristotle's concern in this passage with the origins of communities, as shown by *γίνεσθαι* in a19 and *ἐξ ἀρχῆς συνελθεῖν* at a12. That he is wont to link the *genesis* with the *purpose* of a community is of course also shown by a25–8.

Finally, Bywater's hypothesis cannot account for the argumentative role of the etiology, F. The etiology is introduced with *γάρ*, so presumably it is intended to support some thesis or claim. One naturally reads it as indirectly explaining C and D; yet, again, these are now to be understood as referring back to the material of A. And there is nothing in the etiology which lends especial support to B, which is now placed before it.²²

The emendation proposed by Cook Wilson has various other difficulties. On this hypothesis, the participial clause E is to be read as elaborating and explaining why the thesis articulated in A at a14 holds also for *φυλέται καὶ δημόται*. But the phrase *φυλέται καὶ δημόται* is introduced by the expression *ὁμοίως δὲ καί*, and this expression, when placed before the last member of a list of examples introduced by *οἶον*, typically indicates in Aristotle that the final example merely *admits* of the same treatment as those just mentioned and elaborated: *ὁμοίως δὲ καί* is typically used in such cases to signal that a like elaboration could be provided for the final example, but will not be.²³ Yet on Cook Wilson's hypothesis, the case of *φυλέται καὶ δημόται* is introduced by *ὁμοίως δὲ καί*, and then this is followed by a fuller explanation than those provided for the preceding examples of the list.

Furthermore, it is implausible to interpret E as providing an account of the *κατὰ μέρη συμφέρον* provided by *φυλέται καὶ δημόται*, since it would have been inappropriate to describe the distinctive function of tribes and demes as being *θυσίας τε ποιούντες κ.τ.λ.* It is true that demes oversaw and carried out sacrifices and

²¹ The phrase, 'the men are (or have come about) for the sake of sacrifice and fellowship,' if proposed without qualification, would naturally be read as equivalent to its reduplicative form, viz. 'the men *qua* men are (or have come about) for the sake of sacrifice and fellowship', which is absurd. It would not be absurd to claim, with a qualification, that *ἡ κοινωνοί* the men are (or have come about) *θυσίας ἔνεκα καὶ συνουσίας*, but nothing like this is in the text, and it would not be suggested by *οὔτοι*.

²² Grant and Fritzsche's view has additional difficulties. It is odd to place D but not C in parentheses, since D gives the reason for C and thus should have the same degree of salience. Furthermore, it is awkward to read E—as would be required—as depending upon C: if E were to follow directly upon B, then the participles of E might possibly be taken to refer back to an earlier and implied *κοινωνοί*, but this becomes implausible if *πᾶσαι δ' αὐται* intervenes.

²³ After examining some 446 occurrences of *ὁμοίως δὲ καί* in genuine works of Aristotle, it seems to me that four usages of that phrase can be distinguished. It is used: (i) as an expository connective, to lead the reader into a discussion of a new point which has some (perhaps slight) connection to what has preceded (cf. e.g. *Met.* 1085b27, *Meteor.* 349b2); (ii) to introduce a case which corresponds by some scheme of classification to the case or cases just considered (cf. e.g. *EN* 1106b23, 1115b10, 1155b23; *Poet.* 1451a29); (iii) to introduce a conclusion which is drawn on the basis of an analogy (cf. e.g. *EN* 1104a16, *Pol.* 1326b2, *De An.* 406a25); and (iv) to conclude a list of examples, perhaps introduced by *οἶον*, which illustrate a general principle. This last usage divides into two: (a) where no actual final example is given to conclude the list, but rather a general phrase such as *ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων* is used to indicate broadly that other cases admit to similar treatment (cf. e.g. *EN* 1159b29, 1160a2); and (b) where a final example is provided, but it is not explained or elaborated as were the preceding examples (cf. e.g. *EN* 1113a28, *EE* 1221b23, *Pol.* 1255b22, 1296b30, *Top.* 106a26, 107a8, *De Gen. An.* 768a21). *EN* 1160a18 seems to be an instance of (iv.b).

religious rituals on a regular basis,²⁴ but such activities constituted only a small part of the various functions of the deme, so that it would be unnecessary and even unusual to argue for its subordination to the πόλις by mentioning only its religious function.²⁵ Likewise with tribes: Aristotle in his *Athenian Constitution* mentions the role of tribes in overseeing athletic contests, elections, taxation, jury duty, and court trials, and also their importance for the military, but he ascribes to them no distinctive religious function. Of course, in carrying out religious celebrations, demes were merely mirroring on a local level what the state government was doing for the state as a whole; Aristotle would not have explained the *συμφέρον* of the state by mentioning its religious activities, and there is similarly no reason to interpret him as explaining in this way the *συμφέρον* of the deme. Note also that, because tribes were reorganized and demes introduced under Kleisthenes for frankly political reasons, as Aristotle recognized (cf. *Ath. Const.* §21, *Pol.* 1319b23), if he had wanted to explain the *συμφέρον* of such groups at all, his thesis would certainly have been better advanced by mentioning these other reasons.

The religious activities of the groups mentioned in a19–20 were, however, quite different in kind from those of demes and tribes. The deme or tribe was a subordinate administrative unit of the state, and its activities would be regulated by the state.²⁶ Furthermore, a deme or tribe was in no sense what we would call a ‘voluntary association’, for a citizen was born into a particular tribe and deme, and participation in its activities would be either compulsory or expected. Yet *κοινωνίαι θιασωτῶν καὶ ἐρανιστῶν* were purely ‘voluntary associations’, and their function and relationship to the state would therefore be problematic.²⁷ Hence it *would* be appropriate to provide an extended account of the *συμφέρον* of such groups; yet the text which mentions these groups is to be deleted on Cook Wilson’s hypothesis.

These difficulties are only compounded on Michelet’s hypothesis, which would take **BCD** to be merely parenthetical: for, after telling us that tribesmen and demesmen have a religious function, Aristotle would then immediately be introducing other groups, *κοινωνίαι θιασωτῶν καὶ ἐρανιστῶν*, which have this same function. Moreover, it then becomes problematic why the objection raised in **B** makes use of these latter groups and is not framed in terms of *φυλῆται καὶ δημόται* just mentioned, which would be equally *θυσίας ἔνεκα καὶ συνουσίας*.

Price and Allan’s simple suggestion of merely athetizing **E** also has its problems. If **E** is omitted, then γάρ of a25 is naturally taken to indicate that **F** is intended as an explanation of what is asserted in **D**. But **F** on its own, and without the intervening **E**, seems quite irrelevant to **D**. (It would be a *non sequitur* to respond to the question, ‘What justifies the claim that the political community aims not at the advantage of the moment but at what is advantageous for life as a whole?’ by explaining that sacrificial festivals originated after the time of harvest.) Similarly, if **E** is deleted, **F** seems to provide little direct support for **C**.

²⁴ See J. D. Mikalson, ‘Religion in the Attic Demes’, *AJP* 98 (1977), 424–35.

²⁵ The various magistracies of a deme included only one with a religious character: stewards, secretaries, recorders, accountants, assessors, estimators, advocates, heralds, and finally, sacristans. See R. Osborne, ‘The *Demos* and its Divisions in Classical Athens’, in O. Murray and S. Price, edd. *The Greek City: From Homer to Alexander* (Oxford, 1990), 270.

²⁶ The remark of Christiana Sourvinou-Inwood, that ‘The *polis* anchored, legitimated, and mediated all religious activity’, applies in particular to demes and tribes. Cf. her essay, ‘What is *Polis* Religion?’ in Murray and Price, p. 297. But this would not be true, in the same sense, of a *θίασος* or *ἐρανος*: cf. Osborne, op. cit., 272–3.

²⁷ That some of these groups even had a subversive character is pointed out by Osborne, op. cit., 277.

THE PROPOSED EMENDATION

The solution I wish to propose does not involve rearranging or calling into question any section of the text. Rather, I suggest that δὲ ποιοῦνται be read for τε ποιοῦντες at a23, thus converting the participle into a finite verb. This slight change would resolve all of the linguistic difficulties of the text, for then: (i) the antecedent for the participles of ἀπονέμοντες, πορίζοντες would simply be the subject implicit in the finite verb; (ii) E becomes an independent clause,²⁸ so that there is no need to link it to a previous sentence and thus to regard any intervening material as unwanted; (iii) we can now read the second sub-clause of E (τιμὰς... μεθ' ἡδονῆς) as a participial clause which explains the preceding sub-clause containing the finite verb. (This last point will be explained more fully below.) Furthermore, the argumentative difficulties of the text may then be resolved, in a way which preserves the *prima facie* character of its component passages. The basic reason for this is that, if E is an independent clause, then it becomes possible to read, first CD, and then E (supported by F), as two distinct arguments replying to an objection presented in B.

To see how this is so, let us consider: What is the shape of the argument of a14–30? Aristotle wishes to argue that all communities other than the political community are to be likened to parts of the political community. His argument for this thesis is clearly meant to have the following logical structure:

- (1) All communities, including the political, aim at some advantage (a9–14).
- (2) Communities other than the political aim at some partial advantage (a14–18).
- (3) The political community aims at total or complete advantage.
- (4) If *X* is for the sake of *G*, and *Y* is for the sake of *G'*, and *G* stands to *G'* as part to whole, then *X* stands to *Y* as part to whole.
- (5) Partial advantage stands to total or complete advantage as part to whole.
- (6) Thus the other communities stand to the political community as part to whole (a28–9).

Note that (3) and (4), both of which are fairly substantial premises in the argument, are never articulated. Aristotle probably regarded them as obvious to his audience; indeed (3) corresponds to theses defended elsewhere by him,²⁹ and (4) would presumably be a familiar *τόπος*.³⁰ Likewise, premise (5) is true by definition and so also obvious. Thus the basic materials for his argument are set down by a18, and it would not have been unusual had Aristotle at this point left it to the reader to draw the obvious inference.

But then an objection, B, is introduced: some associations,³¹ in particular, religious guilds and banquet clubs, seem to have as their end the pleasure rather than (it is implied) the advantage of their members. Note that this objection rests on two, unstated assumptions: first, that pleasure is not itself a type of advantage; second, that it is not merely the case that the activities of these associations are pleasurable (for the activities of most associations are such) but rather are that they are directed *solely*, or *primarily* towards pleasure. Aristotle then replies to this objection, by rebutting each of these assumptions in turn.

The reply to the first, constituting CD, is that pleasure may itself be understood as a type of advantage, viz. the 'advantage of the moment' or 'a momentary advantage',

²⁸ A full stop is to be placed after a23, βίον.

²⁹ That the political community aims at a complete and comprehensive good is of course argued for at length in *Pol.* I, cp. esp. 1251b1–8, 1252b28–1253a1, 1253a19–29. The principle in premise (4) appears to be a *τόπος*.

³⁰ I have not been able to find any principle with the exact form of (4), but some close analogues may be found at *Top.* 114a14–16, 147a25–8, 150a14–18, 153b36–154a3.

³¹ κοινωνία may of course be rendered by both 'association' and 'community'.

to be contrasted with advantage extending over 'life as a whole'. The reply to the second is provided by E and supported by the etiology, F. E should now be read: 'And men offer sacrifices, and meet in groups for these things, for rendering honour to the gods and for providing a pleasant rest for themselves.' F may be rendered: 'For the original sacrifices and gatherings seem to take place after the harvest—offerings of first fruits, as it were. For it was largely on these occasions that they would be free from work.' E and F together constitute an argument that the *θίασοι* and *ἐρανοί* alluded to in B exist fundamentally for providing the two advantages: the favour of the gods and the restorative rest which is necessary for beings, like ourselves, who cannot be continuously active (cf. 1176b27–1177a1, *Pol.* 1337b38–1338a2; cp. *De Somno* 455b19ff.). But the argument is rather compressed and needs a fuller elaboration.

Aristotle's basic procedure in EF is to explain the nature of the *θίασοι* and *ἐρανοί* alluded to at B by tracing them to their origins. This is a common method of arguing in Aristotle: to reveal the purpose of a practice by determining whence it originated.³² Recall that *θίασοι* and *ἐρανοί* were purely voluntary associations which, indeed, had some religious character, but which might appear to exist largely for fellowship and the amusement of their members. On the other hand, the *θυσίαι* and *σύνοδοι* of a deme or city would have a more patent religious character, and, because of their established social role, might with greater plausibility be said to have something *συμφέρον* as their purpose. Aristotle's first step is to assimilate the former to the latter using the phrase *θυσίας δὲ ποιοῦνται καὶ περὶ ταύτας συνόδους*: this marks out a certain kind of gathering, and *θίασοι* and *ἐρανοί* are simply asserted to be gatherings of this sort. The plausibility of this assertion depends upon the complex connotations of *θυσία*, which Aristotle here exploits: when the term was introduced as part of the objection at a20, it was meant to connote a festive and pleasurable celebration; Aristotle now trades upon the more religious sense of the word and claims that this corresponds to a fundamental feature of *θίασοι* and *ἐρανοί*.

The next step is to argue that all *θυσίαι* and *σύνοδοι* (now taken to include *θίασοι* and *ἐρανοί*) exist for the two aforementioned purposes. The argument assumes that the character of any sacrificial festival is most clearly revealed in those that are from of old – the original (*ἀρχαίαι*) festivals. As it turns out, harvest festivals are in fact the most ancient festivals: we can be assured of this, since in earlier times it was only after the harvest that there was much opportunity for holding festivals at all (a27–8, cp. *Met.* 981b23). Yet in such festivals there is an intrinsic connection between the festival itself and the offering of a sacrifice taken from the harvest, the *ἀπαρχαί*. So these festivals exist for offering sacrifice. Furthermore, since they are held when the year's work has been completed, they would in fact also meet a natural need for rest and refreshment, in much the same way that sleep in the evening, when the work of the day is completed, is naturally intended to provide rest. Hence, the original festivals are for sacrificing and providing rest; thus also all other *θυσίαι* and *σύνοδοι*, which are in fact derived from these ancient ones; thus also *θίασοι* and *ἐρανοί*, which are correctly grouped with *θυσίαι* and *σύνοδοι*.³³

³² A clear but brief example in *EN* is his explanations of the origin of money, 1133a19–20. Etiologies in Aristotle are typically introduced by *ὁθεν*; he seems fond of revealing the purpose of proverbs and sayings in this manner, e.g. 1155a34.

³³ There can be no doubt that Aristotle is concerned about the apparently conventional character of *θίασοι* and *ἐρανοί*, and that he therefore wishes to show that these too are somehow rooted in nature. This point can be made vivid by developing the analogy with sleep. Consider a world in which artificial lighting has become so widespread that the natural distinction between day and evening no longer holds sway, and people sleep whenever they wish, with some

Thus the objection has been answered, because the two assumptions on which it rests have been rebutted: pleasure is indeed a type of advantage, and, even if it is not, nonetheless, even those associations which seem to aim at pleasure merely attain pleasure (their activities are *μεθ' ἡδονῆς*) in the course of pursuing various partial advantages. Aristotle can therefore conclude (G) that apparently all communities are parts of the political community.

REMARKS ON THIS PROPOSAL

My emendation and reading of the argument depends upon taking **D** to be putting forward a complete argument. It should be noted that it is not uncommon to find *οὐ... ἀλλά...* being used to present a compressed argument within the scope of a single sentence. Examples nearby in the books on friendship may be found at 1155b18, *δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐ πᾶν φιλεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ τὸ φιλητόν*, and 1157b31–2, *καὶ τὰγαθὰ βούλονται τοῖς φιλουμένοις ἐκείνων ἔνεκα, οὐ κατὰ πάθος ἀλλὰ καθ' ἕξιν*. The latter instance is especially interesting, because it is one of a string of arguments and is followed immediately by another consideration: *καὶ φιλοῦντες κ.τ.λ.* Other such instances in *EN*, where *οὐ... ἀλλά...* presents a compressed argument for a thesis and is immediately followed by another, are 1112b33–4, 1117a7–9, and 1174b10–12.

The assimilation of *τὸ ἡδύ* or *ἡ ἡδονή* to *τὸ παρόν συμφέρον*, although not found elsewhere in Aristotle, is consistent with Aristotelian ethical and psychological doctrine. Furthermore, one finds elsewhere in *EN* a connection drawn between *ἡδονή* and *τὸ παρόν*. For example, we are told, at 1146b23, that the *ἀκόλαστος* acts on the principle that *αἰεὶ δεῖν τὸ παρόν ἡδὺ διώκειν*. And if the second *καί* at 1156a32–3, *καὶ μάλιστα διώκουσι τὸ ἡδὺ αὐτοῖς καὶ τὸ παρόν*, should be read, as seems plausible, as exegetical, then one finds here a rough identification of pleasure with ‘what’s available at the moment’. Moreover, the contrasting expression, *τὸ συμφέρον εἰς ἅπαντα τὸν βίον*, is arguably better suited to suggesting (a limited) advantage extended over time than complete advantage at any one time: *πᾶς ὁ βίος* at *Pol.* 1333a31 clearly means ‘the lifespan’. Note also that, on the reading of the argument proposed here, it is understandable that Aristotle uses the expression *ὑπὸ τὴν πολιτικὴν* at 1160a21: at this point in the argument, he is maintaining that pleasure may be conceived of as an advantage, and so understood, it is momentary and thus only part of advantage extending over the lifespan. Thus it is by its *being conceived of* (or *being classified as*) momentary advantage that pleasure is brought under the political community: this admittedly weaker relationship of containment or subordination is then expressed by *ὑπό*.

It might be objected that it is implausible to understand Aristotle to be construing *ἡδονή* as something *συμφέρον*, since it is his practice to distinguish the good, the advantageous, and the pleasant (*ἀγαθόν*, *συμφέρον*, *ἡδύ*), and in fact his division of friendship into three forms in VII.2–4 seems based upon this distinction. But although it is true that Aristotle sometimes uses *συμφέρον* in the narrow sense of *χρήσιμον* or ‘useful’ (1157a14–15, 1157a28, cp. 1104b30–1, 1155b19), it seems that very frequently the word has the wider sense of ‘beneficial’ or even, simply, ‘good’.

perhaps taking only brief naps scattered throughout the day. In such a society the purpose of sleep would be less apparent, and some might even argue that it was solely a diversion or a pleasant distraction. One might argue against this misapprehension in two steps, first, by claiming that all periods of sleep (even naps), are to be treated as a uniform class, and second, by arguing that the character of a member of this class may be discerned by looking to the ‘most ancient way of sleeping’, viz. sleeping after sunset, when people needed rest and there was the occasion for it.

For example, τὰ συμφέροντα at 1104a4 refers to the subject matter of ethics generally and would seem to include τὰ γαθά and τὰ καλά (cp. 1110b31). And when it is used to indicate the aim of a political community, τὸ συμφέρον seems standardly to mean something more than what is merely χρήσιμον. τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον is identified with justice and is perhaps best rendered as ‘the common good’ (1160a13, *Pol.* 1279a19, 1281a20, 1284b16, 1308a12). The πόλις, we are told, originates because of need, which is evidently χρήσιμον, but continues in existence for the sake of living well, which would seem to be something καλόν—yet each of these is apparently something συμφέρον (*Pol.* 1252b29–30, cp. 1278b23).³⁴ Again, Aristotle remarks that a tyrant aims at τὸ αὐτῷ συμφέρον (1160b2) which must mean things *useful* and *pleasant* to himself; but a king aims at τὸ τοῖς ἀρχομένοις συμφέρον, which is principally their virtue, something καλόν. Again, the συμφέρον of the state is the end which deliberative rhetoric is said to appeal to (*Rhet.* 1358b21ff.), yet it is difficult to see how the discussion of *Rhetoric* I.6–7 is anything other than a discussion of τὰ γαθά broadly conceived.³⁵ *Rhetoric* I.7 in particular announces the beginning of an investigation of comparisons among τὰ συμφέροντα, but when this has been completed, at 1366a17–19, we have only been given rules for comparing τὰ γαθά.³⁶

Pleasures in fact are counted among good things at *Rhet.* 1362b5–9 and thus, it seems, among τὰ συμφέροντα understood broadly. They are counted as goods in *EN* as well, at 1157a33, where Aristotle remarks καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀγαθόν—though he is careful to add the important qualification τοῖς φιληδέσιν. Admittedly, this qualification seems to render them merely subjective goods; nonetheless, they *are* goods of a sort. Observe also that he construes pleasures as goods with a very brief remark, in much the same manner as, on the present interpretation, he construes them as συμφέροντα at 1160a22–3.³⁷

Hence, if we do take συμφέρον in VIII.9 to have a wider sense than χρήσιμον, as seems plausible, then there is no outright disparity, either in doctrine or procedure, between CD, as interpreted here, and what is contained in VIII.2–4. Yet it should be said that it would not be a decisive objection, against the present interpretation, that it implied such a disparity: for VIII.9–12 has the appearance of being an independent treatise on friendship as found in communities (whereas VIII.2–4 are concerned principally with friendships between two persons), and the doctrines of the earlier chapters, including the distinction among the three forms of friendship, are almost wholly absent from it. The three forms do indeed seem to be alluded to at 1162a24–6, yet, significantly, this is a passage which discusses personal friendship between husband and wife.³⁸

³⁴ Burnet cites *Pol.* 1278b23ff. in his commentary on *EN* 1160a11–12 and remarks: ‘We see from this that τὸ συμφέρον includes τὸ εὖ ζῆν as well as τὸ ζῆν.’

³⁵ George A. Kennedy explains I.6 in this way: ‘Since deliberative rhetoric aims at what is beneficial and since the beneficial is “good”, a speaker needs to grasp the topics of the good...’. See *Aristotle On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse* (New York, 1991), 16.

³⁶ Kennedy (*ibid.*) gives *Rhet.* I.7 the heading ‘How to Argue that Something Is a Greater Good.’

³⁷ It is an interesting question, why Aristotle considers it necessary to count pleasure as a good in *EN* VIII.4. I discuss a possible reason for this in *Aristotle’s Theory of Friendship* (Harvard diss., 1988), 90–2; cf. also my ‘Friendship and the Comparison of Goods’, *Phronesis* 27 (1992), 129.

³⁸ Price acknowledges that his attempt to apply the three-fold scheme of *EN* VIII.2–4 to political or civic friendship is a project of reconstruction: ‘What makes civic friendship an elusive topic in Aristotle is that the *Politics*, which alone spells out an adequately generous view of a city’s goals, mentions it (at 4.11.1295b23–4) without ever attempting even to characterize it; the interpreter has to proceed, unsatisfactorily, by applying to the concept of the city in the

One final point about the proposed emendation: it might be wondered whether it is plausible to read the participles ἀπονέμοντες and πορίζοντες as expressing a purpose, which is required by my reading. Of course participles naturally express a purpose after verbs of coming and going; but likewise after verbs of making. A ready example would be a10, πορίζόμενοι, which expresses a purpose and occurs after συμπορεύονται. The sentence at a9–10, in fact, provides something of a parallel to a23–5 as I emend it, for in both cases one finds first a finite verb, then a participle expressive of purpose. That ἀπονέμοντες and πορίζοντες are appropriately understood in this way in both cases is also suggested by the context, which is evidently concerned with revealing the purpose of the practice described, a context strengthened by idioms ἐπί + dat. and χάριν + gen. at a10–12, and ἐνεκα + gen. at a20. In any case, a distinction should be drawn between the purpose or intention of an agent, and a purpose, perhaps unconscious or unrecognized, implicit in a practice. It is the latter which Aristotle is here concerned with expressing, and the present participle can very adequately serve in that function.

REMARKS ON THE MODE OF CORRUPTION

The corruption of ποιοῦνται into ποιοῦντες is not extraordinary and requires no special explanation. In this case, the conversion changes the verb form from active to passive deponent. Yet this poses no difficulty, because both ‘to make a sacrifice’ and ‘to gather into an assembly’ can be expressed using either the active or passive deponent voice of ποιεῖω. θυσίας ποιεῖσθαι is in fact found in Aristotle at *Pol.* 1321a35, and in the spurious *Oeconomica*, 1344b19. Furthermore, of 44 occurrences of θυσίας + ποιεῖω I have located in the *TLG*, 23 of 44 have the verb in the middle or passive deponent voice.³⁹ There is no other instance of σύνοδους + ποιεῖω in Aristotle, but in near-contemporary writers one finds ποιεῖσθε ... σύνοδους (Isocr. *orat.* 3.54.1) and σύνοδους ... ποιῶμεθα (Plato, *Leg.* 771d3). A *TLG* search revealed the middle and passive deponent voice being favoured over the active in 15 of 17 occurrences.⁴⁰ This would seem in fact to be strong supporting evidence for reading ποιοῦνται.

Once ποιοῦνται was altered to ποιοῦντες, creating a dependent clause, then δέ at a23 would naturally be changed to τε as a correction, presumably to be read with the following καί. But the result of this would be that the second sub-clause, τιμάς ... μεθ’ ἡδονῆς, would become only loosely joined to the first part. Hence it is understandable that Γ inserts τε at a24, in an attempt to bind together the now awkwardly joined participial clauses of a23–5. That is to say, δέ of a23 was presumably altered to τε with an eye to the τε ... καί ... construction which would then result in a23; but τε was then inserted in Γ at a24 with an eye to the very different τε ... τε ... construction, which would then serve to unify the now loosely connected participial clauses.

Politics the concepts of friendship in the *Ethics*. Hence my reconstruction of civic friendship now will in part be more speculative than any of my earlier treatments of friendship in the *Ethics*’ (Price, *op. cit.*, 29 n. 21). What Price says about the *Politics* in relation to the *Ethics* might with justice also be said about *EN* VIII.9–12 in relation to 2–4.

³⁹ I excluded Judaic and ecclesiastical writers, for whom θυσίας might bear a very different sense, and also sources past 4th C. The proportion is similar for both B.C. and A.D. sources: 13 of 27 sources dated B.C. use the middle/passive deponent form. Examples from near-contemporary and contemporary sources would be: ποιεῖσθαι τὰς θυσίας, Anaximenes, *Ars rhet.* 2.3.8; τῷ θ. πεποιῆσθαι, Demosthenes, *De. Cor.* 86.5; θ. ποιέεσθαι, Herodotus, 1.132.16; θ. ποιήσασθαι, Isocrates, *orat.* 6.31.10; θ. ποιουμένων, *Ibid.*, 96.3; and θ. ποιεῖσθαι, Lysias, *In Nicomachum*, 18.6.

⁴⁰ Again, Judaic and ecclesiastical sources were omitted. Unfortunately, there were in this case only 3 B.C. sources (all using the middle/passive deponent).

If a detailed hypothesis is deemed necessary, of how the original corruption to *ποιοῦντες* may have occurred, it is possible to provide one. Note that the initial word of the corrupted clause, a23, *θυσίας*, is very similar in form to *συνουσίας* at a20. Note furthermore that a20, *αὐται γὰρ θυσίας ἔνεκα*, could be read as a complete sentence. Suppose that a scribe did read it as such and took *καὶ συνουσίας* to be the start of the next sentence, and then at that point skipped down to *-ουσίας* at a23, writing:

αὐται γὰρ θυσίας ἔνεκα καὶ συνουσίας δὲ ποιοῦνται

The scribe, eventually catching his error, marks a point of omission over the *δὲ* and writes the omitted material in the margin. A later scribe reinserts the material, but taking the now obscured *δὲ* to be a *τε*, and noticing the participles *ἀπονέμοντες* and *πορίζοντες* which follow, writes *τε ποιοῦντες*. Note that in this case it would be acceptable to posit an assimilation of endings which is progressive rather than regressive, because the assimilation takes place in the course of restoring an omitted text and hence is done with an eye to the total context of the insertion—what follows as much as what precedes.⁴¹

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⁴¹ I should like to thank Anthony Price, Jeffrey Wills, Paul Plass, and an anonymous reader for helpful comments on earlier drafts. In preparing this paper, I have made extensive use of the TLG on CD-ROM with the Pandora search program.